Category: Trusts

What is a constructive trust?

Parties often request a constructive trust during estate litigation and family disputes over real property and other assets. This claim generally seeks to recover property from someone who has obtained it unfairly. 

A constructive trust is an equitable remedy “erected whenever necessary to satisfy the demands of justice” (Latham v Father Divine, 299 NY 22, 27 [1949]; see also Beatty v Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 NY 380 [1919, Cardozo, J.]).  It may be imposed “‘[w]hen property has been acquired in such circumstances that the holder of the legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest’” (Sharp v Kosmalski, 40 NY2d 119, 121 [1976], quoting Beatty, 225 NY at 386).

There are four elements of a constructive trust: (1) a confidential or fiduciary relationship; (2) a promise; (3) a transfer in reliance of such promise; and (4) unjust enrichment (Sharp, 40 NY2d at 121).  However, these elements have been referred to as merely “factors” (Simonds v Simonds, 45 NY2d 233, 241 [1978]).

In a proper case, the court may impose a constructive trust even if all the elements are not established (see id.; Rowe v Kingston, 94 AD3d 852, 853 [2d Dept 2012]; Cruz v McAneney, 31 AD3d 54, 59 [2d Dept 2006]).  The flexibility of the claim “is limited only by the inventiveness of men [and women] who find new ways to enrich themselves unjustly by grasping what should not belong to them” (Simonds, 45 NY2d at 241 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

Appellate Court Victory: Matter of James H. Supplemental Needs Trusts

In this Mental Hygiene Law article 81 proceeding, we successfully defended the petitioner/guardian on an appeal.  There, the petitioner was appointed as the guardian of James H.  After extensive litigation, the petitioner applied for and received an order awarding counsel fees and compensation for guardian services pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 81.28 (a).  In the same order, the petitioner also received authorization for those amounts to be paid from supplemental needs trusts (SNTs).  James H.’s brother, unsatisfied with the result, appealed. 

On the appeal, the appellate court affirmed.  Among other things, the appellate court concluded that the trial court provided a clear and concise explanation for its award in a written decision with reference to numerous factors, including the time and labor required, the attorney’s experience and ability, the benefit flowing to the incapacitated person as a result of the attorney’s services and the results obtained. 

In addition, the appellate court rejected James H.’s brother’s challenge to the trial court authorizing the payments from the SNTs or, in other words, approving the use of the SNTs for this purpose. The appellate considered the purpose of these trusts and the limitations imposed on them by law.  The appellate court also considered the specific provisions of the SNTs and the services provided by petitioner and her appellate counsel.

The appellate court found that the services benefitted James H. and were the types of services authorized to be paid for by the SNTs.  Among other things, the appellate court concluded that the petitioner’s services as guardian and the legal services provided by petitioner and her appellate counsel successfully resulted in the removal of James’ H.’s brother as trustee of James H.’s SNTs, and that James H.’s brother had been incredibly litigious, obstinate and consistently reluctant to pay James H.’s medical bills and expenses. In finding that the services benefitted James H., the court further concluded as follows:

“Upon [James H.’s brother’s] removal, petitioner was better able to ensure that James H.’s weekly needs were met, resulting in the timely and efficient payment of bills and coordination and receipt of services benefiting him, thus reducing James H.’s anxiety. More importantly, [James H.’s brother] was also the executor of their mother’s estate and, despite the fact that two years had elapsed since their mother’s death, [James H.’s brother] had not transferred James H.’s inheritance into his SNTs, leaving two of the SNTs unfunded. [The] removal further led to the subsequent significant funding of the SNTs, resulting in greater availability of funds for the payment of James H.’s necessities, such as health care, transportation and groceries, as well as personal items to enhance his lifestyle.”

As with any SNT, the appellate court recognized a chief concern was whether payment to a third party from the SNTs would render James H. ineligible for receipt of government benefits or assistance. The appellate court looked to Social Security Administration, Program Operations Manual System (POMS) as guidance and found that the payment from the SNTs would not render James H. ineligible for government benefits.

Does SCPA 2110 Authorize Payment of a Beneficiary’s Legal Fees from the Estate?

“Under the general rule, attorneys’ fees and disbursements are incidents of litigation and the prevailing party may not collect them from the loser unless an award is authorized by agreement between the parties or by statute or court rule” (A. G. Ship Maintenance Corp. v Lezak, 69 NY2d 1, 5 [1986]).  This rule limits this court’s discretion and authority to award fees to a beneficiary payable from an estate (see Matter of Urbach, 252 AD2d 318, 321 [3d Dept 1999] [“all parties to a controversy, the victors and the vanquished, [must] pay their own counsel fees”]; see also Matter of Rodken, 2 AD3d 1008, 1009 [3d Dept 2003] [“An attorney may be compensated from estate funds only for services that benefit the estate”]; Matter of Baxter [Gaynor], 196 AD2d 186, 190 [4th Dept 1994]).  

To be compensated for legal fees from an estate, the “legal services [must] have been rendered for the benefit of the estate as a whole, resulting in the enlargement of all the shares of all the estate beneficiaries” (Matter of Burns, 126 AD2d 809, 812 [3d Dept 1987]; Matter of Wallace, 68 AD3d 679, 680 [1st Dept 2009]; Matter of Baxter [Gaynor], 196 AD2d at 190; see also Matter of Kinzler, 195 AD2d 464, 465 [1st Dept 1993]; Matter of Carver, 19 Misc 3d 1110[A], 1110A, 2008 NY Slip Op 50632[U], *3 [Sur Ct, Essex County 2008] [citing cases]).

On the other hand, “where the legal services rendered did not benefit the estate but benefitted only the individuals whom the attorney represented, the attorney must seek compensation from the clients individually” (Matter of Wallace, 68 AD3d at 680; see also Matter of Rodken, 2 AD3d at 1008; Matter of Baxter [Gaynor], 196 AD2d at 190).

Appellate Court Victory: Matter of Gordon

In a 3-2 split decision, the Appellate Division, Third Department reversed an order of the Surrogate’s Court of Albany County (Maney, S.), which had denied our motion seeking to disqualify the other side’s counsel. 

The appellate court agreed that opposing counsel was disqualified from representing the other side in the case based on opposing counsel’s prior participation in the same estate as a former judge.  The full decision is available at, http://decisions.courts.state.ny.us/ad3/Decisions/2021/529943.pdf

Estate Planning for Millennials.

Part of a series involving practical solutions and tips for millennials to plan their Estates, as well as the consequences of failing to do the same.

Part One: Who gets the dog?

“Whatever one may think of treating our dogs like people- whether it is called ‘humanification,’ ‘personhood,’ or some other means of endowing dogs with humanlike qualities- it is impossible to deny the place they have in our hearts, minds and imaginations. From Odysseus’ ever-faithful dog Argo in Homer’s The Odyssey, to the All-American [C]ollie Lassie, to the Jetsons’ futuristic canine Astro, to Dorothy’s little dog Toto too, they are beloved figures in literature, movies and television. And in real life, where would we be without St. Benards and their casks of brandy in the Alps, Pavlov’s conditioned-response subjects, Balto the hero sled-dog racing to the rescue in the Artic, or, of course the [Obama’s] daughters’ [Portuguese Water Dog, Bo]?”[1]

As I write, my little dog, Princess, naps quietly at my feet. No doubt she is dreaming of chasing squirrels and eating treats. My love for her is immeasurable and I frequently refer to her as my baby. I am in my thirties, unmarried, and she is my constant companion. This dynamic is not uncommon for many millennials, particularly those of us who, through circumstance, or deliberate choice, have delayed or simply decided not to marry or have children. Indeed, millennials now make up the largest segment of pet owners in the country, with 7 out of every 10 of us owning a pet and 67% of those millennial pet owners, referring to the pet as part of the family.[2]

Courts in New York frequently deal with pet custody issues in divorce or family law cases. See Hennet v. Alan, 43 Misc 3d 542 (Sup Ct, Albany County 2014) (deviating from common law belief that pets are merely personal property, but rather a “special category of property,” such that a release agreement executed by defendant as to his rights in personal property did not relinquish his right to custody of the family dog); Travis v. Murray, 42 Misc 3d 447 (Sup Ct, NY County 2013) (where court declined to apply “best interest” standard in pet custody case but instead applied a “best for all” standard). But what about if you die without a will? What happens to your fur baby? For a single person this could mean your closest living relative, typically a parent or parents, will get the pet despite the existence of a long-term partner who you would prefer your pet to live with.

NY EPTL § 4-1.1 provides estate distribution rules when a person dies intestate, i.e., without a valid will. Subsection (a) (4) states that if the decedent dies “with one of both parents [then living], and no spouse and no issue, the whole to the surviving parent or parents.” Traditionally, New York courts have held that animals are personal property-i.e., property, exclusive of real estate, that you own; analogous to a piece of furniture or a vehicle. See Mullaly v. People, 86 NY 365 (1881); Schrage v. Hatzlacha Cab Corp., 13 AD3d 150 (1st Dept 2004); Rowan v. Sussdorff, 147 App Div 673 (2nd Dept 1911); Fowler v. Town of Ticonderoga, 131 AD2d 919 (3rd Dept 1987); ATM One, LLC v. Albano, 2001 NY Slip Op 50103 (U) (Nassau Dist Ct 2001) . What that means is that if you die without a will and you are unmarried, your beloved dog, cat, lizard, turtle, bird, or the like, just like your 2012 Honda, may be going directly to your mom or dad as part of your residuary estate. Even if your partner objects, the pet is still likely to end up with your relative.

“[In] non-matrimonial actions regarding ownership and possession of dogs [that] have generally come before New York Courts … it is the property rights of the litigants, rather than their respective abilities to care for the dog or their emotional ties to it, that are ultimately determinative.”[3]

Many people are reluctant to plan for their own deaths, it’s not a fun topic to think about. Especially as a young person. But think about what would happen to your pet if you died tomorrow without any direction as to how you want your pet cared for. Would your mom even know the name of the vet or what medications the dog needs to treat her elevated liver enzymes? Would your dad honor the cat’s bedtime routine of brushing her fur while listening to 90s alternative rock? No doubt your partner would. You share your life with this person. So how can you best ensure that your pet is cared for in the same manner as you would care for him or her in the event of your death or incapacity?

New York State allows people to provide for their pets in their wills under so called “Honorary Trusts.” See EPTL § 7-8.1. This trust is a relatively new concept in our legal history.[4] Under traditional common law, these trusts were invalid because a valid trust needed an identifiable beneficiary, and the beneficiary needed to be a person or corporation.[5] Why? Because only a person or corporation has standing to enforce their rights in the trust.[6] However, with the passage of time and the increasingly “humanization” of our pets, New Yorkers, as well as people nationwide, can now create these pet trusts.[7]

Pet owners in New York can now create a trust document and deposit funds to be held in trust for the care of their pet together with directions, ranging from general to exceedingly precise, as to how the funds are to be invested and distributed.[8] In addition, the settlor can identify a specific trustee to administer the trust, conditions for the termination of the trust as well as name remainder beneficiaries (i.e., those who get any remaining income and/or principal of trust assets upon its termination).[9]

In divorce and family law cases, such as Hennet and Travis, a recent trend has emerged. The court will not treat the distribution of pets in a divorce in the same manner as the distribution of personal property. The courts have recognized that pets, although traditionally designated as personal property, are special. When determining custody of dogs and cats the courts will now use a “best for all concerned” standard, applying such factors as how the pet was acquired, how the pet was cared for and the actual arrangement between the parties for spending time with the pet after the parties split up.[10]

Case law is silent as to whether this standard would be applied to determine pet custody between your partner and your parents in the event you die intestate without specific arrangements to care for your furry companion. Your death or incapacity should not be used as a lesson to the future lawyers of America about the harmful consequences of failing to provide for your pet. That’s why it is extremely important to work with a reputable and knowledgeable estate planner today to get more information on preparing a will with a valid honorary trust.

Contribution by Elizabeth A. Weikel, J.D. Ms. Weikel recently passed the Uniform Bar Examination and is awaiting admission to the Appellate Division, Third Department.

[1] Travis v. Murray, 42 Misc 3d 447, 451 [Sup Ct, NY County 2013].

[2] Carley Lintz, How Millennials Spend on Their Pets, PET BUSINESS available at http://www.petbusiness.com/How-Millennials-Spend-on-Their-Pets/ [May 29, 2018].

[3] Travis, 42 Misc 3d at 452-453.

[4] For an excellent discussion of the history, evolution and modern view on Testamentary Trusts, the reader is referred to Andrew B.F. Carnabuci, Note, Avoiding the Fate of Argos: The Duty of Pet Trust Protectors in Connecticut 31 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L. J., 281-334 [2018] available at: https://www.quinnipiaclawjournals.com/content/dam/qu/documents/sol/law-journals1/probate-law/volume-31/consolidated-pdfs/quinnipiac-probate-law-journal-volume-31-issue-3.pdf.

[5] See Jennifer A. Taylor, Note, A ‘Pet’ Project for State Legislatures: The Movement Toward Enforceable Pet Trusts in the Twenty-First Century, 13 QUINNIPIAC PROB L. J. 419, 420-421 [1999].

[6] See id.

[7] See Jim D. Sarlis, Pet Trusts: An Important Planning Tool, New York State Bar Association [summer 2018] available at  https://www.nysba.org/Journal/2018/Aug/Pet_Trusts__An_Important_Planning_Tool/  [last accessed Oct. 22, 2019].

[8] See id.

[9] See id.

[10] See Travis, 42 Misc 3d at 460.

Disinheritance Problem Solved – Part 2

Solution

New York law permits a person making her estate plan to cut a pre probate deal with the person who will be cut out.  More specifically, this includes before the testator’s or parent’s death or lack of capacity.  This means that the person to be cut out can be dealt with directly by the testator or parent during the testator’s or parent’s life and on the testator’s own terms.  There are many benefits to this.  First, the person being cut out is required to deal directly with the testator or parent during the testator’s life – rather than fighting with siblings after the testator has died.  The strategy can reduce family strife after the decedent has died.  The commonly asked “why question” in connection with the testator’s estate plan, is answered during the testator’s life, i.e. by the parent, rather than in the court room in the context of a 1404 hearing.  There is immediacy.  In fact, the person cut out of the estate receives his funds (the carrot absent the string) first and before all those sharing in the estate.  There is certainty.  Attorney’s fees and the substantial costs of litigation are curtailed or eliminated. 

Mrs. Cook and Her Niece

Here is how the rule evolved from the thoughtful estate planning efforts of a widow.  In the early 1920s the Court of Appeals decided In re Cook’s Will 244 NY 63, a case which arose in Washington County.  Mrs. Cook was an elderly widow of wealth and decided to make a will disposing of her property to charities.  Her only heirs and next of kin were a sister, a niece and two nephews.  They all were all adults and not close with her.  In preparing for the disposition of her property, she wrote to her niece as follows:

Dear Katherine:

In making my will, it was my intention to bequeath you something.  After consideration, it occurred to me that it will give me greater pleasure to give it now, and you to receive it now, and in doing so I am asking you if you would be willing to sign and receipt an agreement, agreeing that in consideration of this gift now, that you agree that you will not at any time contest or join with others in contesting my will.  The same conditions apply to your (2) brothers, who must also sign such an agreement. *** Kindly let me have full names and addresses of your brothers.

Her niece’s reply indicated that she was glad to receive the gift from her Aunt as her brothers and herself were trying to secure a home for their respective families.  Having failed to state, however, anything about contesting the will, another letter followed on February 8, 1924, written by G.E Knowlton, on behalf of Mrs. Cook, where he stated:

Dear Mrs. Russell:

Mrs. Robert H. Cook has handed me your letter of January 21st in which you state that you would appreciate a gift from her, but you do not say that you will refrain from contesting her will.

May I ask you to be good enough to advise Mrs. Cook as to your attitude in this matter.

A few days afterwards her niece replied:

Dear Aunt Julia:

I am sorry that I omitted to state in my letter that I would agree to the agreements mentioned in your letter. I both appreciate and agree to those conditions.

Thereafter, her niece signed and sent to Mrs. Cook the following agreement:

Dated March 5, 1924.

Received from: Francis Julia Cook

….Dollars

As a gift from her and in consideration of this gift, I agree that I will not at any time contest or join with others in contesting her Will.

The court was confronted with the question:  Having received the advances or gifts under the circumstances, can these heirs and next of kin of Mrs. Cook now contest her will? 

Despite these writings they tried to do so. They alleged that Mrs. Cook was incompetent, and that her will was procured by fraud and undue influence.  In upholding the validity of the agreements not to contest Mrs. Cook’s will, the court held that agreements not to contest another’s will are not void as against public policy.  Further, the court stated that agreements made between heirs and next of kin after the death of the decedent have always been found valid when made in good faith.  Agreements made before the death of the testator regarding the future disposition to be made of the estate are akin to those implied in the taking of a legacy bequeathed upon the condition stated in the will that no contest shall be made.

The rule in New York, is that where a distributee in consideration of a gift from the family member (testator/decedent) during her lifetime, has agreed not to challenge the decedent’s will, he shall not file objections.  The central element of the rule is that by contracting with the decedent for the present day benefit, the distributee divests himself of legal standing to challenge the will.

The effective solution is an arrangement structured as a deal or a contract.  The deal is that the distributee receives present day benefit (payment) in exchange for the agreement not to the challenge the parent’s will on death.  The problem person or child is required to contract away, relinquish and waive the right to challenge the decedent’s will.  The approach is well founded in New York law such that it must be considered as an alternative to years of potential litigation between the disinherited distributee and the estate after the testator has died.

There are some important steps to be followed to avoid litigation.  The proper approach is significant because the ultimate arbiter of the validity of the agreement will be the Surrogate Judge after the testator has died and the distributee attempts to get out of the agreement.  It is recommended that experienced and strong lawyers be involved in the process.  To this end, it is important to have the distributee represented by his own lawyers.  He should not be represented by the decedent’s lawyers.  If money is an issue, the gift can include payment of the distributee’s legal fees under certain circumstances.  The process should be considered as one involving the negotiation of a contract or in the planning context, similar to negotiation of a waiver of a spousal right of election.

As was the case for Mrs. Cook, when done correctly a pre mortum and pre probate gift to a problem person or child can be efficacious and highly successful strategy to avoid estate litigation.

Disinheritance Problem- Solved

Intentions to disinherit in connection with the making of wills are not uncommon.  Disinheritance circumstances give rise to acrimony and much litigation.  In many cases, children and family members often find themselves dealing with these circumstances.

Clients planning their estates often are confounded with how to deal with a formed intention to cut someone out of sharing in the estate.  Putting feelings and emotions aside, it is a matter of carrying out the decedent’s intentions, money and fairness. 

Common Ineffective Solution Attempt

In estate cases in New York, many challenged estate plans contain an in terrorem clause with an additional provision stating that the particular person is cut out or left nothing.  It is not uncommon for a will to make specific reference to the fact that the decedent specifically considered and deliberately intended to leave the person out of the plan.  In some instances, no reasons are stated.  In other cases, no mention of the person is made. 

There are other cases where the will expressly states that the person cut out will not benefit from the will and advances the intended double whammy threat that if the person cut out challenges the will, that person is automatically cut out.  The client drawing the will feels satisfied.

This is a failing strategy and plan.  Coupling the in terrorem clause with a provision that the ditributee, problem person or child receives nothing sets up a guaranteed challenge to the will.   The double whammy threat is empty, meaningless and ineffectual.  In fact, in practice the attempted solution often invites litigation and has no estate litigation deterrent effect whatsoever.

Better Solution Attempt

Quite simply and more properly the in terrorem clause should actually be coupled with a sufficient and enticing incentive.  Think of the cart driver dangling the carrot in front of the mule on the stick extended in front of the animal’s mouth.  For illustration, include in the will an in terrorem clause with a specific bequest of say $20,000 for the problem person.  The incentive of a specific bequest in the plan coupled with the potential for enforcement of the in terrorem clause creates significant risk of forfeiture of the bequeathed sum.  The particular sum in each case must be thoughtfully determined, and often it is not or circumstances change.

This solution is entirely acceptable but in the context of litigation, can be a failure. The carrot and stick approach still subjects the plan to risk and chance – up in the air for future lawsuits.  There is a better approach, which will be discussed in the next blog post.

Summary Judgment in a Contested Accounting Proceeding- Part II

As explained in our prior post from May, “Summary Judgment in a Contested Accounting Proceeding – Disposing of Meritless Objections“, the high standard imposed on a fiduciary creates a low burden for a party to contest the fiduciary’s accounting. Thankfully, the fiduciary may move for summary judgment to dismiss objections that ultimately turn out to be meritless.

But what happens when the opposing party questions the reasonableness of a fiduciary’s conduct. Is the appropriate exercise of the fiduciary’s discretionary power always a question of fact necessitating a hearing? The simple answer is no.

The general rule in New York is that a court will not interfere with the exercise of a trustee’s discretion except in limited circumstances (see e.g. Matter of Hilton, 174 App Div 193 [1st Dept 1916]; Matter of Mitchell’s Will, 30 Misc 2d 781 [Sur Ct, Kings County 1961]; Matter of Irrevocable, 2005 NY Misc LEXIS 3899 [Sur Ct, New York County Dec. 14, 2005]). A party therefore may generally not advocate that the court should substitute its judgment for that of the Trustee’s. This is not the appropriate standard (see Matter of Hilton, 174 App Div at 193; Restatement [Third] of Trusts § 50). Rather, the party opposing summary judgment should tender evidence of fraud, bad faith, or an abuse of discretion to justify a hearing (see e.g. Matter of Hilton, 174 App Div 193 [1st Dept 1916]; Matter of Mitchell’s Will, 30 Misc 2d 781 [Sur Ct, Kings County 1961]; Matter of Irrevocable, 2005 NY Misc LEXIS 3899 [Sur Ct, New York County Dec. 14, 2005]).

In Matter of Hilton, 174 App Div 193 (1st Dept 1916), for example, the appellate court reversed an order of the court below for an increase in annual trust payments to the beneficiary, based on the lack of any evidence demonstrating an abuse of discretion (see also Matter of Irrevocable, 2005 NY Misc LEXIS 3899 [Sur Ct, New York County Dec. 14, 2005]; Restatement [Third] of Trusts § 50). Similarly, Matter of Mitchell’s Will, 30 Misc 2d 781 (Sur Ct, Kings County 1961), the court declined to set the matter down for a hearing unless the Objectant submitted proof that “the trustees’ action amounts to an abuse of discretion, bad faith, arbitrary action or fraud.”

In short, there are numerous cases granting summary judgment in favor of the fiduciary in accounting proceedings. This is especially true where the trust agreement provides the Trustee with discretion and there is no evidence of any abuse of that discretion.

Inheritance By Non-Marital Children

I recently read an article on People.com about a poor young man who became “Lord of the Manor” after DNA proved he was the heir of a wealthy British aristocrat (https://people.com/human-interest/care-worker-inherits-60-million-english-estate-dna-test/). This got me wondering what happens in New York when a non-marital child shows up after the parent is deceased and demands his inheritance. Does he have a right to inherit Mom or Dad’s estate? How do the marital children, if any, respond to his demands?

New York Estates, Powers and Trust Law Section 4-1.2 specifically addresses the question of inheritance by non-marital children. In New York, a non-marital child is the legitimate child of his mother and can inherit from his mother and from her family unless specifically excluded.

But, the rules are different for a non-marital child to inherit from his father’s estate. Before a non-marital child can inherit from his father, paternity must first be established. Section 4-1.2 sets out three methods to establish paternity: (i) an order of filiation issued by a court during the lifetime of the father; (ii) a signed acknowledgement of paternity by the father; or (iii) clear and convincing evidence of paternity, which may include, but is not limited to, DNA evidence or evidence that the father openly and notoriously acknowledged the child as his own.

In some situations, the father either did not know about the child, or he kept the existence of his secret love-child from his family. One way an unknown or secret non-marital child can establish paternity would be through DNA evidence. The burden is on the non-marital child to prove he is the decedent’s child with clear and convincing evidence. First, the non-marital child must commence a Surrogate’s Court proceeding to establish inheritance rights to the father’s estate. A pre-trial motion can then be made for an order to posthumously perform a DNA test.

A court may grant a motion for posthumous DNA testing where the non-marital child provides some evidence that the decedent openly and notoriously acknowledged paternity and establishes that the testing is practicable and reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. (Matter of Poldrugovaz, 50 AD3d 117, 129 [2d Dept 2008].) Factors that courts consider include (i) whether evidence presented demonstrates a reasonable possibility that the testing will establish a match; (ii) the practicability of obtaining the tissue sample for the purpose of conducting the test, including whether it is readily available; (iii) whether there is a need to exhume the decedent’s body or obtain the sample from a nonparty; (iv) whether appropriate safeguards were, or will be, taken to insure the reliability of the genetic material to be tested; and (v) the privacy and religious concerns of the decedent and or his family members. (Matter of Betz, 74 AD3d 1459, 1463 [3d Dept 2010].) The rule is to safeguard the estates of decedents from fraudulent claims. The last thing grieving families need is to have someone show up claiming to be their father’s child and demanding his inheritance without any evidence to back up his claim.

Contribution by Jacque K. Vincent, J.D.

An Interview with an Estate Litigation Attorney (Part 2)

Q. What skills should an Estate Litigation Attorney possess?

A. An estate litigation attorney is required to know the law in several critical areas. First, it is mandatory that the attorney fully understand the law pertaining to the making of a valid will or trust, as that is often the heart of the contest. An estate litigation attorney must know and understand how estate planning attorneys operate and how they develop and achieve a client’s estate plan.

An estate litigation attorney must also know the state and federal procedural rules of the court cold. The attorney is equally required to know how to prove the client’s case. For example, it must be second nature for the estate litigation attorney to prove that a will was properly prepared and signed under the statute that prescribes how to make a valid will or that a person making a will lacked legal capacity or was subjected to undue influence. An estate litigation attorney must not only know the four basic objections to a will, but also know how to either prove a valid objection or successfully defend against objections lacking merit in to obtain a dismissal.

Q. Are there other skills that come in handy?

A. Strong litigation and in particular, trial skills are a tremendous advantage. Many lawyers who draw a lot of wills and trusts and plan estates, try to handle the estate litigation. These well-intentioned but misplaced efforts often result in case failures or settlements too generous to the other side due to a lack of significant estate litigation and negotiation experience. Lawyers with a lot of experience in lawsuits are better suited to taking the deposition testimony of witnesses under oath as they are accustomed to dealing with non-cooperative and evasive witnesses, shades of truth and confrontations with documentary evidence.

Q. Do you need to understand medical proof?

A. It is mandatory. The estate litigation attorney must have significant professional experience with medical/legal matters. It is impossible to handle a case where the decedent’s capacity is an issue if you do not fully understand the medical details of the decedent’s condition. In order to properly handle the case, the lawyer must be fully versed in all medical issues involving the decedent, fully understand all of the medical records and charts, diagnostic tests and results and ultimately, know how to legally prove the decedent’s condition in court. There are countless dismissals of objections that allege only that the decedent was old, of advanced age, senile, demented, weak or sick. Without more and strong medical and lay person evidence, these claims are properly dismissed for failures of proof.

It is a recipe for disaster in a case where a lawyer is unfamiliar with the medical terminology, practices and procedures. Not only can it be embarrassing but the medical witnesses become frustrated with what they perceive to be a lack of preparation and skills.

Q. Why does the Estate Litigation Attorney need to know how lawyers work?

A. Inevitably estate and trust litigation often is an intense study and critique of the drafting attorney’s work and conduct. An objectant’s attorney ordinarily is critical of the work, seeking to attack it to cause the instrument to fail in court. The attacks range from the basics pertaining to the paperwork to the leveling of allegations of attorney misconduct and negligence. In these cases, a strong attorney defending the estate knows the standard of care required to be upheld by the drafting attorney and brings out the drafting attorney’s good work and fine product.

Q. Is invalidating a will or trust in New York courts easy?

A. No. The law favors validity of wills and trusts that are properly prepared and signed. The law makes it difficult to upset valid planning put in place by a decedent. This makes sense for a number of good reasons. First, the law favors and encourages people to plan their estates. The law is deferential to decedent’s lawful intentions rather than imposing generic dispositions. In New York, the law takes it a step further to add a presumption of validity to wills that are signed under the supervision of an attorney. Further, in New York the level of capacity required to make a valid will is quite low. The law sends a strong message to residents who take the time and often incur substantial expenses to plan their estates, that the law will make the success of the estate plan more likely than challenges attempting to destroy it.