What is a constructive trust?

Parties often request a constructive trust during estate litigation and family disputes over real property and other assets. This claim generally seeks to recover property from someone who has obtained it unfairly. 

A constructive trust is an equitable remedy “erected whenever necessary to satisfy the demands of justice” (Latham v Father Divine, 299 NY 22, 27 [1949]; see also Beatty v Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 NY 380 [1919, Cardozo, J.]).  It may be imposed “‘[w]hen property has been acquired in such circumstances that the holder of the legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest’” (Sharp v Kosmalski, 40 NY2d 119, 121 [1976], quoting Beatty, 225 NY at 386).

There are four elements of a constructive trust: (1) a confidential or fiduciary relationship; (2) a promise; (3) a transfer in reliance of such promise; and (4) unjust enrichment (Sharp, 40 NY2d at 121).  However, these elements have been referred to as merely “factors” (Simonds v Simonds, 45 NY2d 233, 241 [1978]).

In a proper case, the court may impose a constructive trust even if all the elements are not established (see id.; Rowe v Kingston, 94 AD3d 852, 853 [2d Dept 2012]; Cruz v McAneney, 31 AD3d 54, 59 [2d Dept 2006]).  The flexibility of the claim “is limited only by the inventiveness of men [and women] who find new ways to enrich themselves unjustly by grasping what should not belong to them” (Simonds, 45 NY2d at 241 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

Appellate Court Victory: Matter of James H. Supplemental Needs Trusts

In this Mental Hygiene Law article 81 proceeding, we successfully defended the petitioner/guardian on an appeal.  There, the petitioner was appointed as the guardian of James H.  After extensive litigation, the petitioner applied for and received an order awarding counsel fees and compensation for guardian services pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 81.28 (a).  In the same order, the petitioner also received authorization for those amounts to be paid from supplemental needs trusts (SNTs).  James H.’s brother, unsatisfied with the result, appealed. 

On the appeal, the appellate court affirmed.  Among other things, the appellate court concluded that the trial court provided a clear and concise explanation for its award in a written decision with reference to numerous factors, including the time and labor required, the attorney’s experience and ability, the benefit flowing to the incapacitated person as a result of the attorney’s services and the results obtained. 

In addition, the appellate court rejected James H.’s brother’s challenge to the trial court authorizing the payments from the SNTs or, in other words, approving the use of the SNTs for this purpose. The appellate considered the purpose of these trusts and the limitations imposed on them by law.  The appellate court also considered the specific provisions of the SNTs and the services provided by petitioner and her appellate counsel.

The appellate court found that the services benefitted James H. and were the types of services authorized to be paid for by the SNTs.  Among other things, the appellate court concluded that the petitioner’s services as guardian and the legal services provided by petitioner and her appellate counsel successfully resulted in the removal of James’ H.’s brother as trustee of James H.’s SNTs, and that James H.’s brother had been incredibly litigious, obstinate and consistently reluctant to pay James H.’s medical bills and expenses. In finding that the services benefitted James H., the court further concluded as follows:

“Upon [James H.’s brother’s] removal, petitioner was better able to ensure that James H.’s weekly needs were met, resulting in the timely and efficient payment of bills and coordination and receipt of services benefiting him, thus reducing James H.’s anxiety. More importantly, [James H.’s brother] was also the executor of their mother’s estate and, despite the fact that two years had elapsed since their mother’s death, [James H.’s brother] had not transferred James H.’s inheritance into his SNTs, leaving two of the SNTs unfunded. [The] removal further led to the subsequent significant funding of the SNTs, resulting in greater availability of funds for the payment of James H.’s necessities, such as health care, transportation and groceries, as well as personal items to enhance his lifestyle.”

As with any SNT, the appellate court recognized a chief concern was whether payment to a third party from the SNTs would render James H. ineligible for receipt of government benefits or assistance. The appellate court looked to Social Security Administration, Program Operations Manual System (POMS) as guidance and found that the payment from the SNTs would not render James H. ineligible for government benefits.

Does SCPA 2110 Authorize Payment of a Beneficiary’s Legal Fees from the Estate?

“Under the general rule, attorneys’ fees and disbursements are incidents of litigation and the prevailing party may not collect them from the loser unless an award is authorized by agreement between the parties or by statute or court rule” (A. G. Ship Maintenance Corp. v Lezak, 69 NY2d 1, 5 [1986]).  This rule limits this court’s discretion and authority to award fees to a beneficiary payable from an estate (see Matter of Urbach, 252 AD2d 318, 321 [3d Dept 1999] [“all parties to a controversy, the victors and the vanquished, [must] pay their own counsel fees”]; see also Matter of Rodken, 2 AD3d 1008, 1009 [3d Dept 2003] [“An attorney may be compensated from estate funds only for services that benefit the estate”]; Matter of Baxter [Gaynor], 196 AD2d 186, 190 [4th Dept 1994]).  

To be compensated for legal fees from an estate, the “legal services [must] have been rendered for the benefit of the estate as a whole, resulting in the enlargement of all the shares of all the estate beneficiaries” (Matter of Burns, 126 AD2d 809, 812 [3d Dept 1987]; Matter of Wallace, 68 AD3d 679, 680 [1st Dept 2009]; Matter of Baxter [Gaynor], 196 AD2d at 190; see also Matter of Kinzler, 195 AD2d 464, 465 [1st Dept 1993]; Matter of Carver, 19 Misc 3d 1110[A], 1110A, 2008 NY Slip Op 50632[U], *3 [Sur Ct, Essex County 2008] [citing cases]).

On the other hand, “where the legal services rendered did not benefit the estate but benefitted only the individuals whom the attorney represented, the attorney must seek compensation from the clients individually” (Matter of Wallace, 68 AD3d at 680; see also Matter of Rodken, 2 AD3d at 1008; Matter of Baxter [Gaynor], 196 AD2d at 190).

Does the Surrogate’s Court Have Jurisdiction Over Lifetime Trusts after the Grantor’s Death?

A decedent may create a trust during his or her lifetime.  What happens after the decedent dies?  Does the Surrogate’s Court have jurisdiction to compel a trustee to account to a beneficiary or determine other matters relating to the trust?   

      SCPA § 207 provides two separate grounds upon which the Surrogate’s Court may exercise jurisdiction over lifetime trusts after the grantor’s death.  Under SCPA § 207, the Surrogate’s Court “has jurisdiction over the estate of any lifetime trust which has assets in the state … or of which a trustee then acting resides in the state or, if other than a natural person, has its principal office in the state.” 

      It is therefore important to determine whether trust assets exist in New York and whether the trustee resides in New York.  If either one of these two grounds exist, SCPA § 207 provides the Surrogate’s Court with jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding.  See SCPA § 207(1); see e.g. Matter of Srozenski v Porcelli, 78 AD3d 1596 (4th Dept 2010); Matter of Jensen, 39 AD3d 1136 (3d Dept 2007).

How Does the Estate Recover Property Wrongfully Taken from the Decedent and Who Has the Burden of Proof?

SCPA Article 21 provides a procedural vehicle for the Estate to recover assets wrongfully obtained from a decedent.   The Estate’s fiduciary may file a petition under these provisions to identify and recover estate assets held by a third party.

“The fiduciary bears the burden to prove that property held by a respondent is an estate asset” (Dwyer v Valachovic, 137 AD3d 1369, 1370 [3d Dept 2016]; Matter of Elam, 140 AD3d 754, 755-756 [2d Dept 2016]).  Where the respondent alleges that the property was lawfully gifted to him or her, however, the respondent has the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, the elements of a valid gift (see Matter of Lang, 53 AD2d 836 [1st Dept 1976]; Matter of Flamenbaum, 6 Misc 2d 122 [Sur Ct, Westchester County 1957]; Estate of Daly, 2 Misc. 2d 570 [Surrogate’s Ct, New York County 1955]).

It is well settled that “to make a valid inter vivos gift there must exist the intent on the part of the donor to make a present transfer; delivery of the gift, either actual or constructive to the donee; and acceptance by the donee” (Matter of Fenlon, 95 AD3d 1406, 1407 [3d Dept 2012] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).  The person claiming a gift “has the burden of proving each of these elements by clear and convincing evidence” (id.; see Roberts v Jossen, 99 AD2d 1002 [1st Dept 1984]; see generally Turano, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 58A, SCPA 2104, at 415).

“He who attempts to establish title to property through a gift inter vivos as against the estate of a decedent takes upon himself a heavy burden which he must support by evidence of great probative force, which clearly establishes every element of a valid gift” (Matter of Conners, 24 AD2d 681, 682 [3d Dept 1965] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).  “[A] gift is never presumed, and the evidence must be inconsistent with any other intention or purpose” (Matter of Kelligrew, 19 Misc 3d 1135[A], 1135A, 2008 NY Slip Op 51010[U], *9 [Sur Ct, Westchester County 2008]).