What is the fiduciary tolling rule?

In Estate of Mathai Kolath George, the Appellate Division, Third Department applied the fiduciary tolling rule to a constructive trust claim in a case involving a fiduciary’s misconduct and her removal.  There, after the decedent passed away, the estate’s fiduciary terminated the decedent’s contract for the purchase of a mansion and entered into a new contract to purchase the property on behalf of an LLC, an entity in which she was the managing member, for the remaining purchase price left on the decedent’s contract.  The then-fiduciary also allegedly used estate funds to pay the remainder of the purchase price left on the contract.    

Several years later, following a trial, Surrogate’s Court removed the fiduciary from her position as executrix and revoked her letters testamentary, finding that she violated her fiduciary duty to the estate by, among other things, failing to identify or account for the estate’s assets, engaging in self-dealing, and commingling the estate’s assets with her personal assets.

A petition was later filed in the estate seeking, among other things, the imposition of a constructive trust on the mansion.   The LLC and another entity filed motions seeking to dismiss the case based on the statute of limitations defense. 

The court concluded that a constructive trust is subject to a six-year statute of limitations and accrued on the date on which the former fiduciary cancelled the decedent’s contract and entered into the contract to purchase the property on behalf of the LLC.

The Court held as follows:

“Under the fiduciary tolling rule, a claim alleging wrongful conduct by an individual in his or her fiduciary capacity does not accrue until there is an open repudiation of the fiduciary obligation or a judicial settlement of the fiduciary’s account ….  This rule tolls the statute of limitations for all misconduct committed by the fiduciary prior to repudiation of its obligation or termination of the fiduciary relationship ….  since, absent either repudiation or removal, the aggrieved parties were entitled to assume that the fiduciary would perform his or her fiduciary responsibilities …, and it is highly unlikely that a sitting fiduciary would assert a constructive trust claim against himself or herself” (internal punctuation marks omitted).

Under this rule, the toll continued until a successor fiduciary was appointed.  The Court found that the statute of limitations was tolled from the date the fiduciary received letters testamentary, until her removal and continuing until letters were granted to a successor fiduciary for the estate, a total toll of four years, five months and 14 days.  Taking this tolling into account, the Court concluded that Surrogate’s Court should not have dismissed the claim based on the statute of limitations defense.

Appellate Court Victory: Matter of James H. Supplemental Needs Trusts

In this Mental Hygiene Law article 81 proceeding, we successfully defended the petitioner/guardian on an appeal.  There, the petitioner was appointed as the guardian of James H.  After extensive litigation, the petitioner applied for and received an order awarding counsel fees and compensation for guardian services pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 81.28 (a).  In the same order, the petitioner also received authorization for those amounts to be paid from supplemental needs trusts (SNTs).  James H.’s brother, unsatisfied with the result, appealed. 

On the appeal, the appellate court affirmed.  Among other things, the appellate court concluded that the trial court provided a clear and concise explanation for its award in a written decision with reference to numerous factors, including the time and labor required, the attorney’s experience and ability, the benefit flowing to the incapacitated person as a result of the attorney’s services and the results obtained. 

In addition, the appellate court rejected James H.’s brother’s challenge to the trial court authorizing the payments from the SNTs or, in other words, approving the use of the SNTs for this purpose. The appellate considered the purpose of these trusts and the limitations imposed on them by law.  The appellate court also considered the specific provisions of the SNTs and the services provided by petitioner and her appellate counsel.

The appellate court found that the services benefitted James H. and were the types of services authorized to be paid for by the SNTs.  Among other things, the appellate court concluded that the petitioner’s services as guardian and the legal services provided by petitioner and her appellate counsel successfully resulted in the removal of James’ H.’s brother as trustee of James H.’s SNTs, and that James H.’s brother had been incredibly litigious, obstinate and consistently reluctant to pay James H.’s medical bills and expenses. In finding that the services benefitted James H., the court further concluded as follows:

“Upon [James H.’s brother’s] removal, petitioner was better able to ensure that James H.’s weekly needs were met, resulting in the timely and efficient payment of bills and coordination and receipt of services benefiting him, thus reducing James H.’s anxiety. More importantly, [James H.’s brother] was also the executor of their mother’s estate and, despite the fact that two years had elapsed since their mother’s death, [James H.’s brother] had not transferred James H.’s inheritance into his SNTs, leaving two of the SNTs unfunded. [The] removal further led to the subsequent significant funding of the SNTs, resulting in greater availability of funds for the payment of James H.’s necessities, such as health care, transportation and groceries, as well as personal items to enhance his lifestyle.”

As with any SNT, the appellate court recognized a chief concern was whether payment to a third party from the SNTs would render James H. ineligible for receipt of government benefits or assistance. The appellate court looked to Social Security Administration, Program Operations Manual System (POMS) as guidance and found that the payment from the SNTs would not render James H. ineligible for government benefits.

Does SCPA 2110 Authorize Payment of a Beneficiary’s Legal Fees from the Estate?

“Under the general rule, attorneys’ fees and disbursements are incidents of litigation and the prevailing party may not collect them from the loser unless an award is authorized by agreement between the parties or by statute or court rule” (A. G. Ship Maintenance Corp. v Lezak, 69 NY2d 1, 5 [1986]).  This rule limits this court’s discretion and authority to award fees to a beneficiary payable from an estate (see Matter of Urbach, 252 AD2d 318, 321 [3d Dept 1999] [“all parties to a controversy, the victors and the vanquished, [must] pay their own counsel fees”]; see also Matter of Rodken, 2 AD3d 1008, 1009 [3d Dept 2003] [“An attorney may be compensated from estate funds only for services that benefit the estate”]; Matter of Baxter [Gaynor], 196 AD2d 186, 190 [4th Dept 1994]).  

To be compensated for legal fees from an estate, the “legal services [must] have been rendered for the benefit of the estate as a whole, resulting in the enlargement of all the shares of all the estate beneficiaries” (Matter of Burns, 126 AD2d 809, 812 [3d Dept 1987]; Matter of Wallace, 68 AD3d 679, 680 [1st Dept 2009]; Matter of Baxter [Gaynor], 196 AD2d at 190; see also Matter of Kinzler, 195 AD2d 464, 465 [1st Dept 1993]; Matter of Carver, 19 Misc 3d 1110[A], 1110A, 2008 NY Slip Op 50632[U], *3 [Sur Ct, Essex County 2008] [citing cases]).

On the other hand, “where the legal services rendered did not benefit the estate but benefitted only the individuals whom the attorney represented, the attorney must seek compensation from the clients individually” (Matter of Wallace, 68 AD3d at 680; see also Matter of Rodken, 2 AD3d at 1008; Matter of Baxter [Gaynor], 196 AD2d at 190).

Can I object to the estate paying the fiduciary’s legal fees?

There are several grounds to object to the estate paying the fiduciary’s legal fees.  One of the most basic objections is to challenge the reasonableness and necessity of the legal services performed (see Matter of Bradley, 128 Misc 2d 240, 241 [Sur Ct, Nassau County 1985] [reducing the attorney’s fee because “some of the work performed was totally unnecessary and the time spent on the balance excessive and unjustified”]; Matter of Bloomingdale, 172 Misc 218, 228 [Sur Ct, New York County 1939] [reducing the attorney’s fee for charges where most of the work of the attorney “involved was unnecessary and of no advantage to the estate and was a duplication of the work of the attorneys who had represented both the executor and executrix in prior years”]; see also JK Two LLC v Garber, 171 AD3d 496, 496-497 [1st Dept 2019] [reduction of the amount requested to eliminate work that was duplicative or was unnecessarily performed; holding that the determination of a reasonable attorney’s fee can take into account whether a party has engaged in conduct or taken positions resulting in delay or unnecessary litigation]; Matter of Rose BB., 35 AD3d 1044, 1045 [3d Dept 2006]). 

            This may be accomplished by reviewing the billing invoices and considering each time entry individually and collectively.  Also review the attorney affidavit discussing the services performed and consider the following:  the time and labor required, the difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill required to handle the problems presented; the lawyer’s experience, ability and reputation; the amount involved and benefit resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee charged by the Bar for similar services; the contingency or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the responsibility involved. 

            You may also challenge the fiduciary’s fee request based on the lack of supporting documentation.  The courts have reduced fees, for example, where the fee request is based upon generalized descriptions of the legal services rendered rather than contemporaneously recorded time charges for the work (see Matter of Phelan, 173 AD2d 621, 621-622 [2d Dept 1991]; Matter of Kelly, 187 AD2d 718, 718-719 [2d Dept 1992] [“We have repeatedly emphasized the importance of contemporaneously-maintained time records as a key component of an attorney’s affirmation of legal services”]; Matter of Quade, 121 AD2d 780, 782 [3d Dept 1986] [acknowledging the importance of time records and holding that the Surrogate’s Court is not obligated to accept unsupported testimony regarding the amount of time claimed to be compensable”]; 22 NYCRR § 207.45 [a] [requiring information regarding “the services rendered, in detail; the time spent; and the method or basis by which the requested compensation was determined”]). 

            Where the fiduciary is guilty of a breach of fiduciary duty or self-dealing, object.  In such cases, the attorney’s fee incurred in defending the illegal acts should not be charged to the estate (see Matter of Hildreth’s Will, 274 AD 611, 615-616 [2d Dept 1949], affd 301 NY 705 [1950]; Matter of Kenney, 64 Misc 3d 1232[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 51389[U], *9 [Sur Ct, Albany County 2019] [holding that inasmuch as the legal fees were incurred to defend petitioner for his wrongdoing, and the associated legal services benefitted him and not the estate, the legal fees were the responsibility of petitioner personally, and not the estate]; see also Matter of Newhoff, 107 AD2d 417, 423 [2d Dept 1985]; Chiesa v Keogh, 23 AD2d 562, 562 [2d Dept 1965] [“the services of counsel to represent an executor against a charge of self-dealing may not be charged to the estate”]).

            Similarly, consider objecting to the payment of attorney’s fees for legal services which were necessitated by the mistake, neglect, and/or misconduct of the fiduciary (see e.g. Matter of Newhoff, 107 AD2d at 423; Chiesa, 23 AD2d at 562 [“Although the erroneous computation of commissions by the executors was the result of an honest mistake, the beneficiaries of the estate should not be penalized by the payment of legal services for defending the executors with respect to such mistake”]; Matter of Hildreth, 274 App Div at 611; Matter of Terranova, NYLJ, July 11, 2012, at 25, col 5 [Sur Ct, Queens County] [denying fee application where found the need for the fiduciary to retain new counsel resulted solely from his own misconduct and holding that the trust should not have to pay for incoming counsel’s learning curve]; 8 Warren’s Heaton on Surrogate’s Court Practice § 106.04 [1] [a] [LexisNexis 2020]). 

            In addition, where the services benefitted only the fiduciary, you may object to them being recoverable against the estate (see Matter of Shambo, 169 AD3d 1201, 1207-1208 [3d Dept 2019] [“Given the minimal, if any, benefit to the estate derived from the years of legal representation …Surrogate’s Court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the payment of counsel fees from the estate”]; Matter of Rodken, 2 AD3d 1008, 1009 [3d Dept 2003] [“An attorney may be compensated from estate funds only for services that benefit the estate”]; Matter of Baxter, 196 AD2d 186, 186 [4th Dept 1994] [reversing attorney’s fee award where the legal services did not benefit the estate but only benefitted the individuals whom the attorney represented];  Matter of Klenk, 151 Misc 2d 863, 863 [Sur Ct, Suffolk County 1991], affd 204 AD2d 640 [2d Dept 1994] [holding that the attorneys who represented the co-fiduciaries in a contested accounting proceeding were not entitled to be paid from the estate since their services were rendered to support the co-fiduciaries in litigation regarding commissions and not to further the interest of the estate]; see also Matter of Gutchess, 117 AD2d 852, 855[3d Dept 1986] [reducing the attorney’s fee and holding that “the evidence does not support the conclusion that petitioner’s representation on [a particular claim] produced significantly favorable results”]; Matter of Schwartz, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 17, 2017, at 22, col. 5, 2017 NY Misc. LEXIS 3890 [Sur Ct, New York County] [holding that the attorney failed to show that the time purportedly spent by him benefited the estate in any way]).

Summary Judgment in a Contested Accounting Proceeding- Part II

As explained in our prior post from May, “Summary Judgment in a Contested Accounting Proceeding – Disposing of Meritless Objections“, the high standard imposed on a fiduciary creates a low burden for a party to contest the fiduciary’s accounting. Thankfully, the fiduciary may move for summary judgment to dismiss objections that ultimately turn out to be meritless.

But what happens when the opposing party questions the reasonableness of a fiduciary’s conduct. Is the appropriate exercise of the fiduciary’s discretionary power always a question of fact necessitating a hearing? The simple answer is no.

The general rule in New York is that a court will not interfere with the exercise of a trustee’s discretion except in limited circumstances (see e.g. Matter of Hilton, 174 App Div 193 [1st Dept 1916]; Matter of Mitchell’s Will, 30 Misc 2d 781 [Sur Ct, Kings County 1961]; Matter of Irrevocable, 2005 NY Misc LEXIS 3899 [Sur Ct, New York County Dec. 14, 2005]). A party therefore may generally not advocate that the court should substitute its judgment for that of the Trustee’s. This is not the appropriate standard (see Matter of Hilton, 174 App Div at 193; Restatement [Third] of Trusts § 50). Rather, the party opposing summary judgment should tender evidence of fraud, bad faith, or an abuse of discretion to justify a hearing (see e.g. Matter of Hilton, 174 App Div 193 [1st Dept 1916]; Matter of Mitchell’s Will, 30 Misc 2d 781 [Sur Ct, Kings County 1961]; Matter of Irrevocable, 2005 NY Misc LEXIS 3899 [Sur Ct, New York County Dec. 14, 2005]).

In Matter of Hilton, 174 App Div 193 (1st Dept 1916), for example, the appellate court reversed an order of the court below for an increase in annual trust payments to the beneficiary, based on the lack of any evidence demonstrating an abuse of discretion (see also Matter of Irrevocable, 2005 NY Misc LEXIS 3899 [Sur Ct, New York County Dec. 14, 2005]; Restatement [Third] of Trusts § 50). Similarly, Matter of Mitchell’s Will, 30 Misc 2d 781 (Sur Ct, Kings County 1961), the court declined to set the matter down for a hearing unless the Objectant submitted proof that “the trustees’ action amounts to an abuse of discretion, bad faith, arbitrary action or fraud.”

In short, there are numerous cases granting summary judgment in favor of the fiduciary in accounting proceedings. This is especially true where the trust agreement provides the Trustee with discretion and there is no evidence of any abuse of that discretion.

Summary Judgment in a Contested Accounting Proceeding – Disposing of Meritless Objections.

Courts often use the term “punctilio of honor” to describe the high level of care and attention required of a fiduciary. The fiduciary must always act cautiously and carefully. But even the most careful fiduciary may still encounter an objection to her actions. There may be a disgruntled family member looking to harass the fiduciary or a party looking to squeeze the estate for some extra cash. Whatever the motive behind the objection, the “punctilio of honor” standard creates a low burden for a party to contest the account. Thankfully, the fiduciary may move for summary judgment to dismiss meritless objections in a contested accounting proceeding.

The summary judgment standard is the same as in any other case. The standard is found in CPLR 3212 and outlined in Zuckerman. First, the fiduciary must establish her defense sufficiently to warrant the court as a matter of law to direct judgment in her favor, and she must do so by tendering evidentiary proof in admissible form (see CPLR 3212 [b]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). If the fiduciary meets this burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show facts sufficient to require a trial of any issue of fact (see CPLR 3212 [b]; see Zuckerman, 49 NY2d at 562).

In terms of practice, the fiduciary satisfies her initial burden by showing that the account is complete and accurate (see Matter of Assimakopoulos, 2017 NY Slip Op 32821[U] [Sur Ct, New York County 2017]). This is often done by submitting the account with an affidavit attesting to its accuracy (id.; see Estate of Curtis, 16 AD3d 725 [3d Dept 2005]). The fiduciary should therefore submit the pleadings, the account, and the affidavit in support of the account. To avoid any doubt, the fiduciary should also submit additional affidavits addressing each specific objection to the account and tender sworn testimony and other exhibits in support of her position. This will provide the fiduciary with the best chance of success on the motion.

If the fiduciary meets her initial burden, the objectant will have to tender admissible evidence to establish that the amounts set forth in the account are inaccurate or incomplete (Estate of Curtis, 16 AD3d at 726; Matter of Assimakopoulos, 2017 NY Slip Op 32821[U] [Sur Ct, New York County 2017]). This procedure smokes out the weak objections from the strong ones and requires the objectant to prove that each objection is strong enough to justify conducting a trial.

As part of the motion strategy, the fiduciary should always serve the motion with enough notice to permit her to demand that answering papers be served at least a week before the return date. This will provide the fiduciary with a chance to review the answering papers and provide a reply. The fiduciary’s reply should highlight the lack of evidentiary support behind the objections and the golden rule set forth in CPLR 3212 and Zuckerman that “mere conclusions, expressions of hope or unsubstantiated allegations or assertions are insufficient” for an objectant to withstand dismissal (Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY 2d at 562).

Goodbye, objections. Goodbye.

Can a Felon Serve As A Fiduciary?

SCPA § 707 sets forth a list of ineligibles – those persons automatically disqualified from serving as a fiduciary in Surrogate’s Court. The statute is clear: felons cannot serve. It does not matter when the felony occurred, the age of the offender at the time, or the type of crime committed. All felons have been branded as unsuitable to manage the affairs of others in Surrogate’s Court.

Notwithstanding the prohibition, felons have argued that exceptions exist and that a certificate of relief from disabilities renders them eligible. This is based on language in the Correction Law providing that a certificate may relieve a felon from “any forfeiture or disability … automatically imposed by law by reason of [the] conviction” (Correction Law § 701 [1]). This statute generally trumps “any other provision of law” to prevent the “automatic forfeiture of any license…, permit, employment, or franchise, including the right to register for or vote at an election, or automatic forfeiture of any other right or privilege” (Correction Law § 701 [1]).

Despite this language, the Surrogate in Matter of McNair was not convinced. There, the court concluded that a certificate does not alter the mandate of SCPA 707. According to the court, the Correction Law “merely affords [a felon] the privilege of obtaining gainful employment” and that a felon “remains ineligible to hold public office, a position for which society’s trust is rightfully expected” (Matter of McNair, 16 Misc 3d 1102[A], 2007 NY Slip Op 51223[U] [Sur Ct, Dutchess County 2007]).

The conclusion reached in the McNair case appears to be a minority view. In Matter of Pullman, for example, the Second Department held that the certificate indeed removes the automatic disqualification (89 AD2d 608 [1982]; Matter of Bashwinger, 92 Misc 2d 716 [Sur Ct, Albany County 1978]; see also Matter of Smith, 14 Misc 3d 1232[A] [Sur Ct, Bronx County 2007]).

Even these cases, however, recognize that a court may still deny the appointment of a felon in its discretion, and that a certificate does not preclude the court from denying the appointment under SCPA 707 (1) (e), which renders persons ineligible for other reasons, including dishonesty (see Matter of Pullman, 89 AD2d at 608; see also Correction Law § 701 [3] [permitting any judicial authority from relying upon the conviction as the basis for the exercise of its discretionary power to suspend, revoke, refuse to issue or refuse to renew any license, permit or other authority or privilege]).

The Surrogate in the McNair case, for example, relied on SCPA 707 (1) (e) as an alternative basis for its decision. There, the felon was a former attorney who had been convicted of grand larceny in the third degree and disbarred. The court found persuasive that at least two prior estates had allegedly suffered financial losses as a result of the felon’s dishonesty.
Similarly, in the Pullman case, the court concluded that the felon was ineligible as a “dishonest” person despite the certificate. He was indebted to the estate, had exercised undue influence over the decedent and commingled trust funds in another case, and had no less than 13 unsatisfied judgments against him.

So, to answer the question posed above – yes, convicted felons may serve as fiduciaries, but only the honest ones.

How the Safe Act Impacts the Transfer of Firearms In an Estate

Inheriting a firearm can be a complicated process. A fiduciary of an estate cannot just give the firearm directly to an heir without the risk for potential criminal liability. Unlike other personal property, passing firearms on to a loved one after the death of the owner has its own unique rules and can be a challenge to the estate’s fiduciary if not specifically addressed during the estate planning stage.

New York’s Secure Ammunition and Firearms Enforcement Act, better known as the SAFE Act, can create the risk of criminal liability for executors and administrators as well as for the estate’s heirs where the parties are unaware of the rules.

Pursuant to the SAFE Act, a fiduciary must lawfully dispose of the firearm within fifteen days after the death of the owner. If the fiduciary is unable to transfer the firearm to the heir within fifteen days, the firearm must be surrendered to a law enforcement agency. The law enforcement agency will hold the firearm until the heir is licensed or otherwise permitted to take possession. However, if the agency does not receive a request to deliver the firearm within one year of the delivery, the firearm will be deemed a nuisance and destroyed (NY Penal Law § 400.05[6]). Fifteen days is a relatively short amount of time in which to make the transfer because a fiduciary cannot lawfully transfer or dispose of a firearm until he has been appointed by the Court.

Before the firearm can be given to the heir, the fiduciary must (1) know that the decedent legally owned the guns; (2) know that the specific beneficiary of the guns may legally own a gun and (3) adhere to proper transfer procedures. The heir receiving the decedent’s firearm must hold a valid New York State gun permit. Illegal possession of a decedent’s registered firearm without following the statutory protocol for estate transfer to an heir is a misdemeanor, specifically, criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree (NY Penal Law § 265.01).

In addition to a state firearm permit, a federal background check is required for a firearm to be transferred. But there is an exception to his rule when it comes to transfers between immediate family members such as spouses, domestic partners, children and step-children (General Business Law § 898).

Contributed by Jacque K. Vincent, J.D.

Do I Need to Pay a Bequest if the Beneficiary Owes the Estate Money?

A fiduciary has a legal obligation to make distributions to the beneficiaries of the estate. But what happens when a beneficiary owes the estate money? Does the law permit the fiduciary to offset the bequest with the debt? Or does the fiduciary have to first make a distribution and then sue the same beneficiary to recover the funds to pay the debt?

As a practical matter, one would assume that an offset is permitted. However, at first blush, the EPTL and SCPA do not appear to address the issue. They provide a beneficiary with the right to compel payment. But they do not expressly provide that a fiduciary may assert defenses to payment (see EPTL § 11-1.5; SCPA § 2102 [4] [“A proceeding may be commenced to require a fiduciary … to deliver a specific bequest or property to a person entitled thereto or to pay a legacy…”]). The only defense in the statute appears to be the timing of the payment: under EPTL § 11-1.5(c), a beneficiary generally must wait at least seven months from a fiduciary’s appointment before demanding payment.

The procedural rules of the SCPA and CPLR nevertheless permit a fiduciary to file an answer and assert defenses when the beneficiary commences a proceeding to compel payment. The fiduciary therefore has an opportunity to explain to the court why the legacy a or distributive share should not be paid in whole or in part (see 6 Warren’s Heaton on Surrogate’s Court Practice § 75.03 [LexisNexis 2019]).

In the answer, the fiduciary should therefore explain that the beneficiary owes the debt and assert this as a defense to payment. This is often referred to as the right to equitable retainer and lien (see Matter of Van Nostrand, 177 Misc 1, 7 [Sur Ct, Kings County 1941] [placing equitable lien upon the beneficial interest of a trustee/beneficiary who had embezzled trust property]; Matter of James, 149 Misc 135, 135-138 [Sur Ct, Kings County 1933]).

This defense is well settled under the case law and rests on sound principles of equity (see Matter of Eaton, 282 App Div 32, 34 [3d Dept 1953]). It is based on “a fundamental equitable principle of surrogate law that no beneficiary may claim any distributive rights from an estate until he has satisfied all of his obligations to it” (Matter of Van Nostrand, 177 Misc at 7; Matter of James, 149 Misc at 135-138 [Sur Ct, Kings County 1933]; Matter of Flint, 120 Misc 230, 232 [Sur Ct, Westchester County 1923], affd 206 App Div 778 [2d Dept 1923]; Matter of Foster, 15 Misc 175, 177 [Sur Ct, Orange County 1895] [holding that a debt is considered an asset of the estate in the hands of the legatee and a satisfaction of the legacy to the extent of the debt]).

What is the Statute of Limitations for a Turnover Proceeding Under SCPA

A SCPA Article 21 proceeding may be used to recover the assets of the decedent when they are wrongfully transferred during the decedent’s lifetime. The issue becomes difficult when you ask when the proceeding should be commenced.

The answer to this question depends on the nature of the underlying wrongdoing. Generally, the applicable statute of limitations is three years, accruing on the date when the property was taken. This is based on equating the proceeding to actions in replevin or conversion.

The applicable period, however, may be much longer. Where actual fraud is alleged, for example, the statute of limitations is generally the later of six years from the fraud or two years from its discovery. Similarly, where a constructive trust is sought or the claim involves allegations of the abuse of a power of attorney, the limitations period is generally six years.

The time period to sue may also be extended even further based on when the claim accrues. For example, a claim involving the abuse of a power of attorney may not begin to run until the fiduciary relationship has been terminated.